2001년 SOFA 환경관련조항이 합의된 이후 협상 결과에 대한 거센 비판이 일어났다. 비판의 대부분은 이념적으로 경도되어 있고, 협상론의 관점에서 연구된 것은 아니었다. 본 논문은 협상론의 관점, 특히 행위자의 선호도를 중심으로 SOFA 환경관련협상의 개선점을 알아보았다. 이를 위해 먼저 본 협상의 특징인 환경 협상, 국제협상이라는 특징과 주요 행위자들의 성향과 역할을 분석하고 이를 바탕으로 선호도를 추출하였다. 주요 참여자들의 선호도를 중심으로 SOFA 환경관련협상을 게임이론으로 구성한 결과 한국 측에서 국방부가 주도하고 외교통상부와 환경부가 지원하는 협상은 협상력의 약화를 가져왔다는 것을 밝혔다. 이를 개선하기 위해서는 강경한 입장으로 협상에 나갈 수 있는 환경 NGO의 참여를 확대하고, 환경부가 주관하는 것이 협상력 개선이라는 측면에서는 바람직했다. 협상의 공전과 타결의 지연이 우리 안보의 약화로 이어진다는 것은 잘못된 추론이다. 또한 협상주도자와 참여자가 확대되었다면 한국의 기존 SOFA협상의 그림자에서 벗어나 새로운 규범과 선례를 활용한 협상전략을 활용할 수 있었을 것이다.

The severe criticism was caused after the agreement of environmental negotiation in the revision of US-ROK SOFA(Status of Forces Agreement) in 2001. Most of criticism were ideologically biased and academically ill-founded. This paper studies environmental revision on the base of negotiation studies, focusing on the preference order of main participants. After reviewing the nature of environmental issue and international negotiation, preference orders were studied. On base of them game matrix shows that ROK had weak negotiation power. The active participant of tough ROK environmental NGO and main role of the Department of Environment Protection should had improved ROK's negotiation power. It is true that mutual contending strategies cause standstill and disturbance in negotiation. Standstill, however, is not breakout of negotiation. With more tough position, ROK could had used better strategy and been away from the shadow of SOFA.

The severe criticism was caused after the agreement of environmental negotiation in the revision of US-ROK SOFA(Status of Forces Agreement) in 2001. Most of criticism were ideologically biased and academically ill-founded. This paper studies environmental revision on the base of negotiation studies, focusing on the preference order of main participants. After reviewing the nature of environmental issue and international negotiation, preference orders were studied. On base of them game matrix shows that ROK had weak negotiation power. The active participant of tough ROK environmental NGO and main role of the Department of Environment Protection should had improved ROK's negotiation power. It is true that mutual contending strategies cause standstill and disturbance in negotiation. Standstill, however, is not breakout of negotiation. With more tough position, ROK could had used better strategy and been away from the shadow of SOFA.

SOFA Negotiation, Preference Order, Game Theory, Environmental Negotiation, Negotiation Strategy.